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INHERITING THE WIND: THE SUPREME COURT AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE 1990s
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING*
T HIS paper attempts to set a context for a discussion of the U.S.
Supreme Court and capital punishment in the 1990s. I hope to
survey a number of the political and legal developments of the 1980s
that will have a significant impact on the character of the Court's in-
volvement with capital punishment in the future. The plan of this Ar-
ticle is to march from the general to the specific, addressing in this
order: 1) the status of capital punishment in the community of nations
in the early 1990s; 2) recent U.S. trends in death sentences, death row
populations, and executions; and 3) the institutional pressures associ-
ated with the Court's prominent role in capital cases and the execution
process.
The justification for this broad survey is my belief that all of the
aspects listed above are important parts of the environment of capital
punishment that both define the Court's work and determine the in-
fluence of this Court's pronouncements on American society and
criminal justice. My conclusion after peeking at the multiple layers of
influence on the Court is that the tensions and conflicts about the
death penalty are not likely to abate in the United States or the Su-
preme Court during the 1990s. Because of the Court's doctrinal state-
ments during the past decade, the stalemate pattern of high death
sentence rates but very few executions outside traditional high execu-
tion states is unlikely to continue during the 1990s. Instead, there may
be an increase in executions in the coming decade that would be a
significant break with the first fifteen years after Gregg v. Georgia.'
But the increase in executions will not reduce the conflict about the
death penalty in the country or the Court. The roots of the conflict
about executions in the United States are deeper than the federal court
pronouncements that the Supreme Court has sought to reverse. Pres-
sure toward a broader execution policy in the United States will gener-
ate both resistance and ambivalence. The courts are likely to remain a
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focal point for public unease. Having sown the seeds for either large
increases in executions or some other institutional actors taking re-
sponsibility for avoiding executions, the U.S. Supreme Court is un-
likely to achieve the distance from executions and death penalty policy
that has been its primary institutional ambition for more than a dec-
ade.
I. INTERNATIONAL TRENDS
My survey of the 1990s will start with the good news: The trend
toward abolition of capital punishment continued during the 1980s
and gained both force and generality toward the end of that decade.
The end of the death penalty was achieved by the early 1980s in the
European Economic Community countries and abolition also was ac-
complished in most of the major nations of the British Common-
wealth.2 Efforts to restore capital punishment in the United Kingdom
and Canada were decisively defeated.' No western nation reintroduced
the death penalty in the decade.4 By the count of Amnesty Interna-
tional, during the 1980s eighteen nations abolished capital punishment
for all crimes and four abolished capital punishment for ordinary
crimes only.' Of the twenty-two abolitions, sixteen occurred in the sec-
ond half of the decade. 6
The upheavals in Eastern Europe and South Africa have been fol-
lowed by strong pressure away from the death penalty. Formal aboli-
tion of the death penalty has occurred in Romania, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia. 7 The former German Democratic Republic, which
had abolished its death penalty in 1987, merged into an abolitionist
union.' Political movements toward abolition are found almost every-
where in the former Communist sphere when democratic reforms take
hold, including the Soviet Union before its breakup. 9 In South Africa,
2. Amnesty International, The Death Penally: List of Abolitionist and Retentionist Coun-
tries, ACT 50/01/92, Feb. 1992 (Table 1).
3. The United Kingdom House of Commons defeated, by a vote of 362-245, a motion to
make terrorism a capital offense. See Jon Nordheimer, Commons Defeats a Move to Bring Back
Hanging, N.Y. TIMEs, July 14, 1983, at A6. The Canadian Parliament defeated, by a vote of
148-127, a motion to restore capital punishment. See Canada's Parliament Rejects Move to Re-
store Executions, N.Y. TimEs, July 1, 1987, at A7.
4. Amnesty International, supra note 2 (Tbl. 1).
5. Amnesty International, supra note 2 (Tbls. 1 & 2).
6. Amnesty International, supra note 2 (Tbls. I & 2).
7. Amnesty International, supra note 2 (Tbl. 1).
8. Amnesty International, supra note 2 (Tbl. 1, note **).
9. The Soviet government reported to a United Nations survey that executions were "a
temporary and exceptional measure ... temporarily applied pending [their] complete abolition"
in 1987. See Roger Hood, The Death Penalty in International Perspective, (Amnesty Interna-
tional), Dec. 11, 1991, at 5.
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which averaged well over 100 executions a year in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, executions were suspended in 1990 and a law reform
process that could point toward abolition has begun. 0
The move toward abolition in many Eastern European countries
has been abrupt, without much evidence of the incremental and grad-
ual steps many western nations have experienced. The short time be-
tween the collapse of predecessor regimes and abolition suggests that
rejection of the death penalty is part of the discrediting of the preced-
ing regimes more than a modeling of the new government on particu-
lar western models. In Romania, shooting the previous dictator and
then abolishing the death penalty seem two ways of rejecting his re-
gime in much the same way that Germany and Italy moved away from
capital punishment shortly after the second world war while the major
Allied powers retained the death penalty for decades thereafter."1
The enthusiasm for abolition in Eastern Europe seems a demonstra-
tion that the movement away from executions is seen principally as a
limit on government power. The association between nonexecution
policy and government respect for human rights on other fronts
is not, of course, fortuitous. Both nonexecution and human rights
policy are derived from the same conception of the proper
relationship between citizen and government in the political and
social order. That conception involves a negative constraint on
government regarding its use of individuals as a means to political
ends. ' 2
It is precisely that "negative constraint on government" that makes
the end of executions an early agenda item for democratization in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The Eastern European develop-
ments since 1989 provide a time-series demonstration of the link be-
tween abolition and other human rights to confirm the cross-sectional
evidence that had been used to support the theory in earlier scholar-
ship.
As Eastern Europe was joining Western Europe in policies of non-
execution, execution as an instrument of state power has become al-
most exclusively a Third World phenomenon practiced with
10. See ]an H. van Rooyen, Toward a New Post-Apartheid South Africa: With or Without
the Death Sentence? 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1993).
11. Amnesty International, supra note 2 (Tbl. 1), dating abolition by the Federal Republic
of Germany in 1949 and by Italy in 1947 (for ordinary crimes); France did not abolish until
1981. The two-step English process took place in 1965 and 1970. FRANKLIN ZnOING AND GOR-
DON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHIMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 12 (1986) (English data).
12. ZIMRING AND HAWKINS, supra note 11, at 23.
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enthusiasm only in Moslem states, in China, and parts of Africa." In
the industrial West, only the United States has executions. This isola-
tion of the United States among its peers is more pronounced in the
1990s than ever before.
II. THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1980s
To classify the United States as a nation with capital punishment in
the 1980s would be inaccurate and misleading. The United States fed-
eral government has not conducted an execution since 1963 and in all
likelihood will not have one until the twenty-first century.' 4 The fifty
state governments are divided into three categories, with about one-
fourth of the states having no death penalty, another fourth maintain-
ing a death penalty on the statute books and conducting at least one
execution during the decade, and half having a capital punishment
statute on the books but conducting no executions since the 1960s. 11
Throughout the 1980s, the United States was a place where death
sentences were not uncommon in a majority of states but only thirteen
states executed anyone. 6 The resulting buildup of death row popula-
tions through the decade is shown in Figure 1, which compares execu-
tions in the United States by year with the January 1 death row
population for that year and the number of death sentences.
The visually striking element of this graphic is of substantive impor-
tance: It is difficult to fit execution trends and death row populations
on the same chart. Figure 1 shows new death sentences averaging
above 250 per year throughout the 1980s while the execution total in-
creased from one in 1981 to twenty-one in 1984, then stabilized at
about twenty per year for the second half of the decade. The result is
that death row populations expanded inexorably from fewer than 600
at the beginning of 1980 to 2,250 by December 1989.
13. Amnesty International, supra note 2 (Tbl. 4).
14. Franklin Zimring, Drug Death Penalty: A Federal Tantrum, N.Y. TnrEs, Sept. 16,
1988, at A35.
15. Franklin Zimring, Ambivalence in State Capital Punishment Policy: An Empirical
Sounding, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 729, 730(1990).
16. Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. Id. at 733 n.7.
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Figure 1. Executions, New Death Sentences, and Death Row
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Source, Death Row Population and Executions: DEATH Row U.S.A.
(NAACP Def. & Legal Educ. Fund, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 24, 1991;
Source, New Death Sentences: BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUST., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1990.
Three aspects of the trend comparison between executions and
death row populations are noteworthy. First, the number of execu-
tions in the United States rose quickly in the early 1980s but leveled
off for the rest of the decade. Because the death row population kept
growing, the rate of execution measured against the total population
at risk fell during the late 1980s from its 1984 peak of just under two
percent. The average number of executions during 1984-86 was nine-
teen, compared with the eighteen per year average during 1987-89. But
this seemingly flat total comprised 1.2% of the average year-end death
row population in the earlier years and only 0.806 of the year-end av-
erage in the later years.' 7
Second, the huge growth in death row populations that took place
in the 1980s was not a product of an upward trend in death sentences.
There was about a three percent expansion in death sentences, from
245 in 1981 to 251 in 1989, but each year's rate of death sentences was
17. The year-end death row average for 1984-86 was 1,586 and for 1987-89 was 2,119.
DEATH Row U.S.A. (NAACP Def. & Legal Educ. Fund, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 24, 1991.
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more than ten times its rate of executions. Unless major changes in
sentencing, execution, or commutation policies come on line, the
death row population could exceed 5,000 in the next decade.
The third notable fact about trends in death row populations and
executions is that the volume of executions has not responded in any
obvious way to variations in death row population during the 1980s.
If and when the rate of execution responds to fluctuations in the pop-
ulation at risk, execution numbers will constantly increase until the
number of executions and other removals from death row equals or
exceeds the rate of new death sentences, currently slightly fewer than
300 per year.
Very few states actively participated in the execution business dur-
ing the 1980s, creating one major restraint on executions during that
time. Only a third of the jurisdictions with death penalties executed
anyone during the decade, and the concentration of executions among
a very few Southern states persisted throughout the decade. Between
1977 and 1985, thirty-six of fifty executions, or seventy-two percent of
the total, took place in four states: Texas, Florida, Georgia, and
Louisiana. 8 From 1986 through the end of 1989, fifty of the seventy
executions that occurred, just over seventy percent, were in the same
four states. 9 When four jurisdictions out of fifty execute three times
as many persons as all other jurisdictions combined, executions can-
not yet be considered a national policy. This hyperconcentration
would also appear to be an unstable situation.
One of the most remarkable elements of the death penalty history
of the late 1980s was the drop in new states conducting executions.
From 1981 through 1985, nine states conducted their first execution.2
By contrast, from 1985 through 1990, only two of the twenty-five
states with death penalties but no prior executions joined the execu-
tion roster. 2'
One other significant feature of the capital punishment policies of
the 1980s was the extent to which the states that began to execute in
that decade were a self-selected sample of jurisdictions with long his-
tories of high levels of executions. Of the thirteen states that started
executions before 1990, 22 ten were also among the twelve states with
18. Id. at 175-77.
19. Id. at 177-78.
20. ZIMIN AND HAWKINS, supra note 11, at 129 (Tbl. 7-1).
21. Zimring, supra note 15, at 732 (Tbl. 1).
22. Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. Zimring, supra note 15, at 734 (Tbl. 2).
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the highest per capita rate of executions in the 1950s, 21 the last decade
during which state execution behavior was substantially free of federal
court control. The odds against this kind of recent selection occurring
by chance are less than one in 22,000.24 Thus, those states that were
historically strongly inclined toward execution were most likely to
have carried out an execution during the decade despite the interven-
tion of federal courts. This suggests that local climate in the twenty-
three death penalty states that did not execute in the 1980s contributed
in some important way to this result." While the primary restraint on
execution in the United States during the 1980s was the federal court
system, the pattern of executions also suggests that complete restraint
occurred most often in those jurisdictions with some historic ambiva-
lence about capital punishment.
Nonexecution in twenty-three of thirty-six capital punishment states
during the 1980s occurred because of a complex interaction between
federal law and procedures and local conditions. The national govern-
ment was also surely a restraint in the most execution-prone states.
Texas, for example, had the largest number of executions in the
United States during the decade, but its 1990 death row was, nonethe-
less, ten times the number of its executions during the 1980s.26
A variety of processes not well understood leveled off the growth in
execution and the spread of execution to new states from the mid-
1980s on. As can be seen in the next section, however, the rulings of
the U.S. Supreme Court during this period were not directed at re-
straining executions.
III. THE SUPREME COURT IN THE 1980s
Most of the opinions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court in death
penalty cases during the 1980s fit surprisingly well into a global sum-
mary statement: Most of the justices have been trying to make the
Court a less important institution in the regulation of capital punish-
ment and to make capital cases a less conspicuous and less important
part of the Court's workload.
The effort to disengage the Court from capital punishment work
has raised issues of both substance and procedure and has involved
23. Alabama. Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, South Carolina, Texas,
Utah, and Virginia. Zimring, supra note 15, at 738 (Tbl. 3).
24. Zimring, supra note 15, at 736-37.
25. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Okla-
homa, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington. and Wyoming. Zimring,
supra note IS, at 734.
26. Zinring, supra note 15, at 731 (Fig. 2).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist and former Justice Powell in extrajudicial
lobbying to reduce the press of capital punishment cases on the Court.
As early as 1983, an analysis of the Court's work was appropriately
titled Deregulating Death,27 and both the force behind this campaign
and the divisiveness of these cases for the justices increased after mid-
decade. Many of the holdings in the 1980s illustrate the irregularities
the Court was willing to tolerate in the name of federalism. These ir-
regularities included execution of the retarded28 and upholding death
sentences despite statistical evidence of racial disproportion in death
sentences. 9 But the most noteworthy departure from usual Court de-
corum-and the clearest window into the majority's motivations-
came in the sustained attack on habeas corpus as a mechanism to keep
capital cases continually before the federal courts and ultimately the
Supreme Court. Strong pressure was exerted to reduce the occasions
on which substantive constitutional challenges could be heard by fed-
eral courts in capital cases in the report of the Powell Commission in
1989,30 in Chief Justice Rehnquist's lobbying,3 and finally in the
Court's decision in McCleskey v. Zant.3
The problems with repetitive raising of issues already litigated in
state or federal courts have been variously described as abuse of the
writ, excessive delay in execution as a frustration of justice, or the
subversion of the system by manipulative lawyers.33 At one level, the
debate about habeas corpus can be seen as a power struggle between
capital defendants and the justices for control of federal court dock-
ets. In this sense, it is the potential of multiple habeas procedures to
take agenda-setting power out of the hands of the Supreme Court
Justices that particularly bothers the opponents of multiple habeas. In
fact, defendants do not have the power by themselves to set a compul-
sory agenda for the U.S. Supreme Court. But sympathetic hearings
given to condemned prisoners by federal district courts can be a
chronic problem for a Supreme Court that wishes to downplay the
place of death cases in its workload.
If too many death cases are viewed as the overriding problem, an
obvious solution would be a set of substantive principles and jurisdic-
27. Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 305.
28. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
29. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
30. Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, Report on Habeas
Corpus in Capital Cases, 45 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3239 (1989) [hereinafter Powell Commission].
31. See, e.g., Text of Chief Justice William Rehnquist's remarks to ABA, reprinted in CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 14, 1989, at 2.
32. 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
33. See, e.g., Text of Chief Justice William Rehnquist's remarks, supra note 31.
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tional limits that restrict the discretion of lower federal courts. If
norms of nonintervention can be imposed on the federal courts, non-
intervention can become the neutral principle that obliges the Supreme
Court to avoid efforts to restrain executions. Once such norms have
the force of law, perhaps the public will see that the Supreme Court
Justices cannot intervene: Their hands are tied. This will, of course,
require short memories about the fact that the justices, after lobbying
for outside restriction for years, finally fashioned the nonintervention
knot themselves.
Why this appetite to avoid decisionmaking responsibilities in death
cases? I do not think that enthusiasm for executions can explain the
Court majority mustered in McCleskey. Some justices may have a
substantive pro-capital punishment bias, but Justice White, for exam-
ple, voted with the majority in McCleskey 4 after providing the fifth
vote against death in Furman v. Georgia.3 Nor would I classify
Justice O'Connor's performance in death cases as bloodthirsty. And
Justice Powell, in the Powell Commission report, seemed more con-
cerned with the political vulnerability of federal courts than by a pau-
city of executions. 36
A key to the broad support for jurisdictional limits on capital cases
is not direct concern about federalism but the self-protective intention
to insulate the federal courts from the hostility and damage that active
involvement in capital cases has generated. In this view, the federal
courts' role as the visible mechanism for stopping executions in the
United States for twenty-five years has contributed to public hostility
toward courts in general and the federal courts in particular.
The wish behind restructuring capital case jurisdiction is that less
intense involvement of the federal courts would ease the pressure on
the deliberate processes of the Supreme Court and diminish the extent
to which the Court is blamed for the delays and frustrations that ac-
company capital cases. The larger the perceptual distance between ex-
ecutions and the Court, the better for the Court's internal workings
and public relations.
While the wish to distance the Court from the execution process is
only a subtext in McCleskey, there is a more palpable aspect of this
desire in the Chief Justice's statements and the justification for proce-
dural change put forward by the Powell Commission. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, in his 1989 midyear State of the Judiciary address to the
American Bar Association, said:
34. 481 U.S. 279(1987).
35. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
36. See Powell Commission, supra note 30.
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In the case of Ted Bundy, the so-called "serial killer" executed in
Florida last month, the Supreme Court of the United States received
three separate applications for a stay on the day before the date
scheduled for execution.
All three of these actions were being prosecuted in these courts
simultaneously on the day before the execution of a prisoner who
had been on death row for nine years. Surely it would be a bold
person to say that this system could not be improved.37
The Powell Commission underscored this concern by isolating
"last-minute litigation" as a substantial separate concern involved in
capital cases. Its report stated that "[i]n most cases, successive peti-
tions are meritless, and we believe many are filed at the eleventh hour
seeking nothing more than delay." 3 The system the Commission
wishes to put in place is one where "[tihe merits of capital cases
should be reviewed carefully and deliberately, and not under time
pressure. This should be true both during state and federal collateral
review. But once this review has occurred, absent extraordinary cir-
cumstances there should be no further last-minute litigation."19
Why is this "last-minute litigation" a problem for the Powell Com-
mission? As long as lawyers for the condemned are a conspicuous
presence just prior to execution, there is an intimate link in the public
mind (and in the perception of many Court personnel) between the
Court and the execution process. This intimate linkage creates a no-
win public relations dilemma. If executions are halted, the Court is
frustrating the operation of other governmental activities. If execu-
tions proceed, blood is on the hands of the justices. And so the solu-
tion desired by the Powell Commission is some mechanism that would
eliminate the dilemma of "last-minute litigation."
As a matter of literal fact, it is difficult to imagine how the incen-
tive for last-minute litigation could be totally removed from a system
of capital punishment in which condemned prisoners are represented
by counsel because last-minute appeals are frequently the only ray of
hope available at that point in time. Yet this is the clear wish reflected
by the Powell Commission, as well as in the Chief Justice's specific
indictment of eleventh-hour appeals,4 and in the majority opinion of
McCleskey v. Zant.41
37. See, e.g., Text of Chief Justice William Rehnquist's remarks, supra note 31, at 5.
38. Powell Commission, supra note 30, at 3240.
39. Powell Commission, supra note 30, at 3240 (emphasis added).
40. See. e.g., Text of Chief Justice William Rehnquist's remarks, supra note 31.
41. 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
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The disengagement with capital punishment that many on the Su-
preme Court now seek is a return to the conditions that existed in the
United States before 1960. Before the large-scale intervention of fed-
eral courts, the important controls over execution policy were at the
state level. 42 That is where a condemned offender's last hope of clem-
ency or postponement resided. The popular culture remembers accu-
rately when the movies of the 1930s through the 1950s began the
execution scene with the announcement that the governor had turned
down a petition for clemency. In that version of American govern-
ment, it could be said that the micro-management of the number of
executions in the United States and their timing was not the business
of the United States Supreme Court. One corollary to this perception
was that the executions that did occur were rarely regarded as the
moral responsibility of Supreme Court justices.
IV. THE PROSPECT FOR DISENGAGEMENT
Will the Supreme Court work itself free of the perceived responsi-
bility for execution policy in the United States during the 1990s? My
doubts that this goal can be achieved in this decade (or later) grow
from the substantial problems associated with reversing historical
processes. Moreover, I expect that events in the 1990s will conspire
against the Supreme Court's quiet withdrawal from the business of
regulating executions.
The first major obstacle to disengagement is the general difficulty
of undoing history. The current American clich6 on the subject is that
it is difficult to get the toothpaste back into the tube. For three dec-
ades, federal courts have been intimately involved in the regulation of
capital punishment, and this has changed both public perceptions and
the expectations of a number of important constituencies including
lawyers, governors, and federal judges. Executive clemency all but
disappeared in the United States in the era of hands-on federal court
involvement. 4 Extensive involvement in individual death penalty cases
has come to be expected of and by federal courts. This new tradition
has rendered cutbacks in federal habeas corpus a contentious issue,
even in a Congress anxious to append more than fifty new death pen-
alties to the federal criminal code." So there is a substantial amount
of toothpaste to squeeze back into the tube before the recent history
of federal court involvement in capital cases can be nullified.
42. See Zi ,INo AND HAWKINS, supra note 11, ch. S.
43. See ZIMRING AND HAWKINS, supra note 1, ch. 5, at 101.
44. See Clifford Krauss, After Senate Backs Bush and Blocks Anti-Crime Bill, Congress
Goes Home, N.Y. TwEs, Nov. 28, 1991, at D22.
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Furthermore, conditions in the 1990s will be anything but favorable
for such an outcome. The best case for successful federal court disen-
gagement would be a combination of low levels of public involvement
and high levels of judicial agreement with a nonintervention policy.
But neither public apathy nor judicial solidarity appears on the hori-
zon. Executions are still important news stories even in the few states
that execute with some frequency. And a pending execution in a
northern industrial state is a sure prescription for a media circus, cre-
ating conditions that exacerbate public ambivalence about capital
punishment and focus attention on the institutions that hold power in
the execution process. Increasing numbers of executions in states with-
out strong capital punishment traditions can only increase the salience
of the death penalty as a public issue in the 1990s. This is not a favor-
able environment for an institution of government that has been the
most important actor in capital cases for twenty-five years to tiptoe
off stage. Increasing public attention to executions in the United
States is thus a barrier to disengagement of the courts.
So too is the absence of consensus in the federal judiciary in sup-
port of nonengagement policies. If almost all federal judges agreed
with a hands-off policy, the absence of debate within the judicial
branch would provide some apparent legitimacy to disengagement.
Notwithstanding the almost complete conservative restaffing of the
United States Supreme Court and the large number of conservative
appointments to federal district and appellate courts, the potential for
judicial disagreement on disengagement policy is substantial. The po-
tential for disagreement on deregulating death begins at the top, with
the United States Supreme Court .4 During the 1980s, even as Reagan
appointments to the Court accumulated and the appointees behaved
in predictable fashion, the division of the Court in capital cases by
most conventional measures increased. Notwithstanding the dissents
of Justices Brennan and Marshall, the majorities that disposed of cap-
ital cases in the first half of the eighties were usually substantial.4 In
the latter part of the 1980s, however, the majority of all death cases
were decided by five-to-four votes. 47 So a potential for division on the
Supreme Court cannot be ignored even in an era of conservative he-
gemony.
In the federal district and circuit courts, an extraordinary potential
for resistance to federal court disengagement can be found in the hun-
45. See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitu-
tion, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1741 (1987).
46. Franklin E. Zimring and Michael Laurence, Capital Punishment, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE




dreds of life-tenure judges who have participated in more extensive
death case review and who are not happy at the prospect of allowing
large numbers of executions. Indeed, federal district and circuit court
judges were the most important restraint on the number of executions
during the seven years after 1984 when the uptrend in executions was
effectively halted.
An impression of disarray is necessarily communicated when life
and death issues are decided by five-to-four majorities, and when
whole judicial circuits split down the middle on death penalty cases. 48
The potential for division is significant even if a majority of circuits
supports hands-off results because far more than a majority of the
United States Supreme Court will be necessary to create conditions in
which the public no longer views the Court as responsible for execu-
tions. As long as federal courts engage in extensive tugs of war in
individual cases and as long as the role of the federal courts is actively
debated within the judiciary, the high profile of the federal courts,
and specifically of the U.S. Supreme Court, in capital cases will be an
unavoidable fact of American political life. It will thus take extraordi-
nary changes both in constitutional law and the composition of the
federal courts before capital cases become anything but a chronic ail-
ment for the federal judiciary.
48. See Dan Morain, Harris Case Splits Appeals Court, L.A. Trmis, Dec. 4, 1991, at A3.
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